




Helpdesk Report: The teacher labour market in Pakistan  
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Query: Produce a report: 
1) Describing the existing evidence on Pakistan/South Asian teacher labour markets 
comparing teacher salaries against salaries in other sectors for individuals with similar levels 
of qualifications and experience.  
2) Looking at the existing evidence on teachers in the low-fee private sector in Pakistan and 
in other contexts with thriving low fee sectors to answer: how segmented is the labour 
market? Who teaches in these schools? Why? Is the current wage paid to teachers in the low 
fee sector a market clearing wage?   
3) Aim to discuss what the potential implications of a minimum wage legislation could be on 
teachers within the low-fee sector.  
 
Purpose: To focus on the potential impact of a minimum wage legislation on teachers in the 






2. Methodology and quality of evidence 
3. Evidence on the teacher labour market in South Asia  
4. Evidence on teachers in the low-fee private sector 
5. Is a minimum wage for teachers feasible and appropriate in Pakistan 
6. Bibliography 





This report undertakes a rapid review of existing literature and summarises some key 
evidence on the teacher labour market in South Asia. It specifically focuses on salaries and 
conditions of teachers in the low-fee private sector in contexts where these sectors are a 
significant part of the education system. In doing so, this review aims to help inform the 
development of DFID’s policy position on the minimum wage legislation in Pakistan as it may 
pertain to teachers, specifically in the private schooling sector (specifically the low-fee sector 
and among other non-state actors).   
 
Definitional issues and caveats 
 
It is important to caveat some definitional and measurement concerns before synthesising 
existing research on these issues. Low-fee private schools (LFPS), sometimes also referred 
to as low-cost private schools (LCPS) – typically tend to encompass any ‘market-oriented 
(nominally for profit) schools that are dependent on user fees for some or all of their running 
and development costs’ (Mc Loughlin, 2013). As a result, these schools tend to not only have 
a degree of independence from the state but also rely on attracting and retaining pupils to 
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ensure viable and successful business models. Moreover, they are distinct from elite private 
schools in that they typically charge fees that are deemed more affordable to families in lower 
socio-economic groups (ibid) and they tend to locate in rural areas and slums as well as in 
locations where low-income families reside. The broad ‘low-fee private school’ category 
encompasses an array of different types of providers:  
a) With different motives: for example religious and philanthropic schools and NGO-run 
schools targeting specific communities or marginalised groups to purely private schools 
operating on for-profit business models and Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
arrangements where the government may heavily subsidise and regulate the school which 
makes the distinction between private and public education blurry. 
b) Operating at varied scales: operated by single owner-operators to large international 
chains. 
c) Targeting different clients including the rich as well as those from poorer backgrounds.  
There are further distinctions between types of LFPS – those that are officially ‘recognised’ by 
the state and the ‘unrecognised’ schools which operate ‘off the radar’ and are not regulated 
or recognised as even existing on government records.  
 
There are further challenges in piecing together a comprehensive picture of the true nature 
and scale of private provision. For example, in India most existing data sets (such as ASER) 
collate private aided and private unaided schools into a single ‘private’ category and whilst for 
some states this distinction is unimportant, for others it is not. Furthermore, a major caveat in 
our understanding of the low-fee private sector is that despite knowing of its existence and 
the fact that it is increasingly catering to a large share of children in many parts of the world, 
the exact scale of low-fee private schools is not reliably documented. There are no consistent 
accounts of what exactly a ‘low-fee private school’ is, for example at what fee threshold is a 
school deemed to be ‘low-fee’ and catering specifically to a certain group of individuals. The 
evidence reviewed in this paper, therefore, is not based on a well-defined notion of a ‘low fee 
private’ school but encompasses literature on the private sector which may or may not 
include clear cut distinctions and definitions. These deficiencies in the data are also echoed 
by Srivastava et al. (2013) who highlight the paucity of comprehensive data on the proportion 
of recognised and unrecognised schools, distortions in existing data, no official definition of a 
‘low-fee private school’ and difficulty making comparisons across existing data sets due to 
differences in operationalization with data such as ASER not distinguishing between aided 
and un-aided schools, in India.  
 
Private schools cater to large populations in many developing countries 
 
Nevertheless, there is now a large body of literature documenting the emergence and the role 
of the private sector – no matter how homogenously defined – in being a major player in 
providing education in many parts of the developing (and developed) world. This explosion in 
particular of for-profit schools in rural and poor settings has been documented in India, 
Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, Mozambique and Kenya among other settings by Tooley and 
Dixon (2005), Dixon (2012), Alderman, Orazem and Paterno (2001), Andrabi, Das & Khwaja 
(2013), Aslam (2009) and several others. South Asia, and India and Pakistan specifically, 
have seen a tremendous rise in the private sector catering to rural populations.  
 
This rise in private enrolments has been consistently documented by the Annual Status of 
Education Reports (ASER) since 2005 in India and since 2009 in Pakistan. To illustrate, 
consider the evidence from India’s official District Information System on Education (DISE) 
data that show that over the short four year period from 2010-11 to 2014-15, enrolment in 
public schools fell by 11.3 million students and enrolment in private unaided schools rose by 
18.5 million students. In some Indian states now, nearly 50% or more of the elementary 
school age children are attending private unaided schools. Evidence of a similar nature exists 
in Pakistan with the Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER) from various years 
continually showing high and increasing enrolments in ‘private’ and ‘non-state’ schools even 
in rural areas of the country. Overall, the share of the private primary education in Pakistan in 
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2015 was 39 per cent (Carneiro, Das and Reis, 2016). The growth of private schools, 
especially the LFPS, is arguably most visible in Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces. 
For example, some argue that virtually all the gain in school participation in Punjab over the 
2004/05 and 2010/11 period especially at the primary level is attributable to private schools 
(Aziz et al. 2014).  
 
Many poor parents are willing to pay for private schooling  
 
The growth of the private sector in so many parts of the world and especially in rural areas 
and urban slums has been arguably driven by discontent with the poor quality of state 
schooling provided. Even in environments where parents are poor and where they can 
access free government schooling, the evidence appears to suggest that they are willing to 
pay for private schooling. Other factors, such as reduced distance to school through 
accessing private schools also play an important role. A recent paper from rural Pakistan 
(Carneiro, Das and Reis, 2016.) strongly corroborates this finding. Using unique data from 
112 rural education markets (villages) in Punjab, Pakistan with thriving private sectors 
resulting in significant choice between state and private schooling, the authors show that the 
existence of a low-fee private school market is greatly valued by households in their sample. 
Moreover, the authors find that families are willing to pay between 75% and 115% of the 
average annual private school fee for a 500 meter reduction in distance. In contrast, they find 
price elasticities to be low – 0.5 for girls and 0.2 for boys, and the authors argue that this 
evidence on distance and price elasticities is at odds with the policy makers’ belief that school 
fees deter enrolment and participation.  
 
These small numbers suggest that very large increases in tuition fees would be required to 
induce large shifts away from the private sector (Carneiro et al, 2016, p. 26). Parental 
willingness to pay for private schooling for girls also stems from the predominant female 
teachers that are typically found in these schools. The authors of this study, for example, find 
that the elasticity of demand with respect to female teachers is positive for girls and negative 
for boys and on average girls’ parents are willing to pay an additional $2.8/year for an 
increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion of female teachers in the school, which 
corresponds to about 20% of average annual school fees in a private school (p. 30). This, the 
authors note, is a large amount and ‘is consistent with the fact that the average proportion of 
female teachers is close to 90% in schools attended by girls.’ (p. 31). Proximity of private 
schools, a conducive environment for female students, a client-focused business approach, 
better learning outcomes and parental preferences for fee-paying schools have also been 
cited as contributing to low cost private schools’ competitive advantage according to a recent 




Teachers in South Asia are generally well paid not only when compared to the average 
person in the population but also when compared to similarly qualified individuals within the 
population. However, whilst teachers in the public sector tend to earn between 5-7 times as 
much (and sometimes far more) than the GDP/capita and comparable salaries to similar 
professionals in other occupations, teachers in the private sector earn far less. More 
specifically, teachers in the low-fee sector earn up to a tenth (and even more) of their 
government school counterparts. Such gaps are reported in India, Pakistan, the Dominican 
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Mozambique and several other countries. With public sector 
salaries growing even more in recent years due to revisions in Basic Pay Scales and through 
union demands, these gaps between government and private sector salaries are likely to 
have widened further. However, raw comparisons of teacher wages are confounded by the 
differences in characteristics observed between teachers in the two sectors; teachers in the 
government sector are more qualified, have received more training and have more 
experience. However, even after controlling for these observed differences between 
  
4 
teachers, much of the wage gap between private and government school teachers remains 
unexplained (Andrabi et al. 2008).  
 
The low salary paid to teachers within the low-fee sector is an important condition for the 
viability of their business model. As teacher salaries constitute a large proportion of the total 
costs of running schools in South Asia, charging low fees from pupils is contingent on paying 
staff less. These wages, often well below the minimum wage, are market clearing wages that 
reflect the dynamics of the market and the existing demand and supply conditions. Whilst 
there is evidence of low morale and dissatisfaction amongst teachers in the low-fee sector, 
limited outside options available to those working within it means that they often continue to 
remain employed within these schools unless faced with better employment opportunities or 




The feasibility of imposing a broad-based minimum wage legislation for teachers, especially 
those working in the low-fee sector within the Pakistani context is questioned by this study. 
Firstly, the scale of the private school sector – specifically the low-fee variety with most 
schools likely to be unregistered and unrecognised and hence not even existing on 
government books – is not known. This, in turn, raises the question of how such legislation 
will actually be implemented. Secondly, one needs to consider the impact of such legislation 
on the operations of small-scale informal low-fee enterprises which rely on charging low fees 
by paying low salaries. One implication of such legislation would be that it may expose these 
low-fee schools to further illegality and corruption when faced with the prospect of meeting a 
government mandate that they cannot fulfil or, worse still, cause large scale closures.  
 
It is important that the government effectively regulate the functioning of these enterprises but 
effective regulation should be based on the realities of all kinds of providers which now exist 
in Pakistan rather than on the elite and larger urban private schools alone. The implications of 
legislation and ordinances on the diverse range of providers need to be carefully considered 
but this is typically not the case. This is usually partly due to a lack of understanding about 
the true nature of the private sector with education legislation being framed with the more 
‘visible’ urban high-fee charging private schools rather than being mindful of the diversity of 
private schools at varying fee levels. The need for further research in gaining a better and 
more comprehensive understanding of low-fee schools is vehemently echoed by Srivastava 
(2013) who notes that our initial understanding of this sector is, at best, ‘tentative’ and should, 
therefore, be treated with caution (p. 28). 
 
 




This review is based on a quick scoping of published and unpublished research on the 
teacher labour force in the South Asia setting as well as in some other contexts where the 
low-fee private sector and non-state sectors are known to be prevalent. Evidence was 
scoped from a range of sources including published papers in peer reviewed journals as well 
as from reports and documents from agencies and organisational websites and through direct 
requests from authors known to be working on these issues. Wherever possible, we aim to 
highlight evidence on Pakistan. However, where evidence is available from other contexts 
where the low-fee sector is prevalent, it is discussed to provide comparisons.   
 
 




As noted before, despite intense interest in the private sector, there is limited research on the 
scale of the private sector in many parts of the world. Pakistan is no exception. A lack of 
knowledge about the true nature and extent of private provision and enrolments at different 
education levels results in educational legislation and policy for private schools being made 
under the disadvantage of serious knowledge gaps. For example, there is scattered 
information on the fee/costs/teacher salaries of private schools and the value for money they 
offer, or on the effect of chains of private schools; and there is no evidence on teacher 
unionisation in, and the political economy of, the private education sector, as well as its 
system-wide effects (Day Ashley et al. 2014). In Pakistan, most of the evidence on low-fee 
schools is based on research funded by the World Bank based on the LEAPS data set from 
villages in rural Punjab. These data, longitudinal in nature, are rich and able to robustly 
answer very specific questions. However, these findings are not generalisable to other 
contexts even within the country. Other, more recent research is also not generalisable and 
work by Aslam and Kingdon (2011), though highlighting some very important features of 
teachers within the two sectors, is limited to only Lahore district. There are some recent 
reports on the low-fee sector (specifically those funded by DFID) that address the access to 
finance for low-fee schools using a sample across 3 provinces but, yet again, the findings are 
not generalizable across these provinces.  
 
The analysis undertaken in this study, therefore, collates a wide range and quality of 
evidence from Pakistan and from other contexts to provide answers to the specific questions 
posed. In particular, the study highlights the need for more research on the nature and role of 
private schools in Pakistan and elsewhere, focusing specifically on identifying all types of 
private schools rather than collating them into one homogenous category. It is also important 
to highlight that research in this area could significantly benefit from a multi-disciplinary lens 
that focuses at the extent to which educational legislation and policies impact different 
providers and specifically the low-fee variety. In doing so, it is also important to understand 
how specific policies and interventions that have been aimed and designed to deliver quality 
education specifically with regards to the private sector interact with contextual dynamics and 
with what impact.  
 
 
3. Evidence on the teacher labour market in South Asia 
 
This section discusses existing evidence on the teacher labour market in South Asia. The 
section focusing on salaries is based on literature that has used Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 
and secondary data from different contexts within South Asia to document teacher salaries 
without necessarily being able to differentiate between teachers in government and private 
sectors (let alone disaggregate further to teachers within low-fee schools).  
 
Incentives offered to teachers will clearly affect their attitudes and ultimately how effective 
they are and the structure of teacher salaries, therefore, has the potential to significantly 
impact teacher effort and ultimately student outcomes. This is especially important in South 
Asia where up to 90% of government education budgets are spent on recurrent salary 
expenses of civil service teachers (Dundar et al. 2014, p. 2091). How well are teachers, 
regardless of sector of employment, paid within the South Asia region?  
                                                 
 
1 The background paper containing all the teacher wage analysis for this book chapter was prepared by 
Aslam, Rawal and Kingdon (2014). 
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A World Bank book (Dundar et al. 2014) benchmarks teacher salaries in several ways in an 
attempt to answer this question: 
1) In the first instance, it compares teacher wages by computing the ratio of teacher 
salaries as a proportion of a country’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP or 
income) and comparing it within the region and with other countries. This ratio allows 
us to identify how affluent (or poor) teachers are with respect to an average person in 
a given country. It is also a measure of the economic and social distance between 
the teachers and the student with a larger ‘distance’ hinting at a potential barrier to 
teaching. 
2) Alternatively, it compares teacher salaries to those of similarly qualified individuals in 
other occupations in the labour market.  
 
As already mentioned, it should be noted that these benchmarking exercises are done 
without differentiating between the two distinct teacher labour markets experienced by 
teachers in the government and in the private sectors.  
 
‘Teachers’ in South Asia are relatively well paid   
 
The tables below (Table 1 and 2) indicate that whilst there is significant heterogeneity in 
teacher salaries (for all teachers regardless of whether they are in private or government 
sector jobs and across all education levels) across the region, on average, teachers are 
better off than the average person in both Bangladesh (teacher salary is twice as much as 
per capita GDP in 2002) and in Pakistan (ratio of 5.2). These compare with ratios of 3 is to 1 
for Asian countries and for 2 is to 1 for OECD countries (Mingat 2002).  
 
Table 1: Ratio of teacher salary to per capita income (Takas) by Division, Bangladesh 
 











Table 2: Ratio of teacher salary to per capita income (Rupees), by province, Pakistan 
 
Source: Dundar et al. (2014), Table 5.6 (p.210). 
 
Table 3: Ratio if teacher salary to per capita income (rupees), by state, India 
 
 




Additional evidence from India (Table 3) also paints a similar story – whilst there is 
heterogeneity across states (with teacher salaries as a multiple of per capita GDP as high as 
11.7 in Bihar), on average across the Indian states teacher salaries are more than 4 times as 
high as per capita GDP. A teacher in India is 4 times as better off than the average person.  
 
Benchmarking using the second technique, i.e. comparing teacher salaries with those of 
‘similar’ individuals in other occupations also indicates that whilst teachers are paid similar to 
other occupations in Bangladesh, teacher salaries (within both government and private 
sectors and across all education levels) are better than those in other occupations (Tables 4 
and 5 illustrate the cases of Pakistan and Sri Lanka). 
 
Table 4: Teacher pay relative to other occupations, Pakistan 
 




Table 5: Teacher pay relative to other occupations, Sri Lanka 
 
Source: Dundar et al. (2014), Table Annex 5.9 (p.212). 
 
Dundar et al. (2014) further document a relatively advantageous position of teachers across 
countries in South Asia where teachers work significantly fewer hours than individuals in 
other occupations and earn significantly higher hourly salaries than other ‘similar’ individuals. 
Moreover, contrary to common perception, the study demonstrates how teacher salaries 
have tended to rise significantly over time with some of the largest increases in real terms 
(adjusting for the Cost Price Index) being seen in teacher salaries in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka between 2000 and 2008. Aslam and Rawal (2015) report similar findings as do Aslam 
et al. (2016). 
 
 
4. Evidence on teachers in the low-fee private sector 
 
Teachers in the public and private sectors face different labour markets 
 
As mentioned before, the analysis on teacher salaries discussed in the previous section was 
unable to differentiate between teachers in the government and private sectors. However, 
with the emergence of the private sector as a major player across many parts of South Asia 
and given the heterogeneity within the private sector, it is very important to differentiate 
between teachers within the two sectors (and further) as they typically face a completely 
different set of incentives and work environments with resultant implications for student 
outcomes. 
 
More general evidence on the segmentation within private and public sectors from within 
Pakistan suggests that the Pakistani labour market is characterised by very large wage gaps 
between public and private sector workers (Aslam and Kingdon, 2009). In 2004–2005, men in 
government jobs earned on average Rs.8211/month ($137)1 and in private jobs only Rs.5420 
($90), a private:public ratio of 1:1.5. This raw public–private wage difference is even higher 
for women, the private:public wage ratio being 1:3, i.e. Rs.6614/month ($110) in public jobs 
and Rs.2160/month ($36) in private sector jobs. This particular study goes on to show that 
the large raw gaps in public and private sector earnings persist for both males and females 
even after conditioning on observed characteristics (such as education levels, experience, 
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and province and region fixed-effects). The study also shows the public–private wage gap to 
be much larger for women than for men signifying labour market differentiation to be far 
greater for women across the two sectors.  
 
In terms of how teacher salaries are determined across the two sectors, there are very clear 
differences. Whilst the civil service teacher salaries are based on basic pay scales and 
reward experience and tenure, the private sector determines a market clearing wage (see 
below). This is the case across labour markets in South Asia as well as in parts of Africa 
where the private sector has emerged as an important player in the education market. The 
teacher labour market characteristics are also different across the two sectors – for example, 
a significantly larger percentage of women are typically observed to be teaching within the 
private sector as compared to the government sector in South Asia. As an illustration, 
consider some demographic features of the teacher labour market in Pakistan (see Box 1 
below). The labour market for teachers across the two sectors (state and private) looks 
similar across other parts of the region as well (for example, India).  
 
Box 1: Teacher labour market characteristics: illustrative example from Pakistan 
 
According to ISAPS (2010), the number of teachers in the private sector institutions is large 
and this reflects the large private sector within the country. Whist there were 0.3 million 
teachers in private educational institutions in 1999-2000 according to this report, this figure 
had doubled by 2007-2008 (see table below) – with 44% of the 1.4 million teachers working 
in the private sector in 2008.  
 
The number of female teachers in private educational institutions is also twice the number of 
male teachers (74% versus 26% across all education levels).The public sector teaching 
cadre looks different – in Punjab province, for example, according to 2012-2013 estimates 
reported in Alif Ailaan (2015), among the 327,307 public school teachers, 47% were female.  
 
Table: Number of teachers in private schools (2000-2008), Pakistan 
 





Evidence from rural Pakistan discussed in the LEAPS report (Andrabi et al. 2008) also 
suggests that in rural markets in the low-fee  private schools, teachers are predominantly 
young, unmarried females – for example, in their sample from rural Punjab, the authors find 
76% of teachers in private schools to be female (as compared to 57% in government 
schools), have a median age of 21 (as opposed to 40 in government schools), are typically 
unmarried (82% females unmarried in private schools are opposed to 14.8% in rural 
government schools) and typically reside in the same village where they teach (56% female 
teachers in private schools as opposed to only 19% in rural government schools in the 
sample).  
 
The demographic profiles of teachers in government and private schools are also different in 
terms of qualifications, experience and training – teachers in government schools are better 
qualified, have received training and are more experienced as compared to their private 
school counterparts (see LEAPS 2008, Aslam and Kingdon 2011 and ILM IDEAS 2014). 
 
 
Civil service teachers are politically active and propagate non-benevolent agendas, 
private school teachers are typically not organised 
 
Other studies have similarly documented large increases in the salaries of civil service 
teachers in different parts of South Asia. The salary of regular teachers in government 
schools in Indian states, for example, is documented to have gone up manifold and in some 
states by as much as 100%. This is largely the result of a reform aimed at increasing the 
take-home pay of teachers under the ‘Sixth Pay Commission’. Under this reform, whilst pay 
increases were agreed in late 2008, they were applied retrospectively from 1st January 2006. 
Kingdon (2010) shows that after the implementation of the 6th Pay Commission, salaries of 
regular primary school teachers in Uttar Pradesh increased by 115 percent, 101 percent 
increase for high school teachers and 103 percent increase for senior secondary school 
principals. Similar findings are reported by Jain and Dholakia (2009) who show the increase 
in salaries to be close to 285 percent in 2006 with a further increase by 200 percent in 2011. 
This gap in teacher earnings and the earnings of the rest of the population has had a major 
negative consequence of increasing the economic and social distance between teachers and 
students particularly as many teachers belong to upper social groups/castes whilst the pupils 
they teach tend to come from disadvantaged backgrounds. This social distance can generate 
prejudices to the detriment of the learning outcomes for the students (Rawal and Kingdon 
2010).  
 
There is evidence that civil service teachers have played a crucial role in propagating the 
agenda of demanding salary increases. There is now emerging evidence from the South Asia 
region that documents a strong political presence of civil service teachers who are well 
organised into associations and unions and well entrenched in the political arena to be able 
to influence key educational agenda items. Evidence also suggests that teachers tend to 
present less benevolent agenda items such as demanding salary increases and lessened 
work-loads rather than more altruistic demands that may benefit students (Aslam et al. 2016). 
According to a recent report on teacher unions in Pakistan, one of the key role teachers’ 
organizations have played in recent years is in waging successful campaigns for the 
betterment of their own salaries (Alif Ailaan, 2015). The government of Pakistan has diligently 
revised government (and teacher) salary scales in the country. These salary revisions have 
successfully occurred in 1981, 1983, 1991, 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008 & in 20112 etc. Since 
then, there have been further revisions in the basic pay scale (BSP) of all government sector 
employees, including teachers3. Table 6 shows that over a three year period (2008-2011), 
                                                 
 
2 http://unesco.org.pk/education/documents/2014/publications/Status_of_Teachers_in_Pakistan.pdf  
3 http://www.itechsoul.com/government-employees-new-revised-pay-scale-2015-bps-budget-2015-16  
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government teacher salaries (basic pay) were revised by about 40%. According to the Alif 
Ailaan report (2015), all teacher organisations have tended to converge around some core 
issues, with salary increase often being one of the most prominent and persistent demands. 
 
Table 6: Basic Pay Scale revisions for Teachers, 2008-2011, Pakistan 
 
Teacher type 












Min Max Min Max 
Primary School Teacher 3820 10720 6200 17600 38 39 
Elementary School 
Teacher 
4920 16320 8000 26300 39 38 
Secondary School 
Teacher 
6060 20160 10000 34000 39 41 
Head Teacher  9850 24650 16000 40000 38 38 
Source: Adapted from UNESCO (2013)4, Table 4.1, cited in Aslam et al. (2016). 
However, this is in sharp contrast to private school teachers who are not organised into 
formal associations and typically do not have a voice (Alif Ailaan 2015). Similar findings have 
been observed in other parts of the developing world – Harma (2015) notes that teachers in 
low-fee private schools ‘…are not unionised and so do not engage in collective bargaining.’ 
(p. 182). There is also evidence that civil service teachers have resisted education 
privatisation in Pakistan (see Box 2 below). 
 
Box 2: Education privatisation resisted in Pakistan by civil service teachers 
  
Aslam et al. (2016) state:  
 
‘In Pakistan, teacher organizations have also vehemently and almost unanimously opposed 
the privatization of education. Teachers have tended to view with extreme suspicion the 
mushrooming of private schooling across the country and the support the government has 
provided to the meteoric rise of the private sector. Teachers have argued that this has 
resulted in low and often unqualified entrants entering the profession, lowering its status and 
given the government the opportunity to revise the terms of government teacher contracts (by 
offering temporary contracts, or linking performance to pay) or even more drastically with 
government schools being offered for example to the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) 
under a Public-Private-Partnership scheme which demotivates them and puts their jobs at 
risk. Teachers have resisted these changes by repeatedly striking and lobbying, with several 
strike actions reported in 2016: on 1 February, 2016, a demonstration was held in Rawalpindi 
led by the Punjab Teachers’ Union (PTU)5, followed by several others (including one in 
Layyah, Sindh, on 17 January, 2016)6. At the time of writing this report, a newspaper article 
(dated 22 March, 2016) cited teacher unrest in Punjab over this issue and in particular with 
the provincial education department’s circular handing over 145 government primary schools 
                                                 
 
4 http://unesco.org.pk/education/documents/2014/publications/Status_of_Teachers_in_Pakistan.pdf  
5 http://www.teachersolidarity.com/blog/teachers-in-pakistan-fighting-schools-privatisation  
6 http://nation.com.pk/national/17-Jan-2016/teachers-up-against-schools-privatisation  
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in Rawalpindi district to PEF and the government ‘relieving 590 teachers of the privatized 
schools and (handing) over their services to the executive district office, education (and) to 
‘adjust them in other schools’’. Teacher unions have ‘warned’ the government of Punjab that 
they will resist this move vehemently and wage resistance by demonstrating and ‘taking to 
the streets.’7 
Source: Aslam et al. (2016). 
 
Private schools pay low wages to their employees (typically women) and this is a 
necessary condition for the viability of the low-fee school model 
 
Most low-fee private schools are informal enterprises and the viability of their business model 
requires meeting certain critical conditions. In particular, paying a low wage, sometimes a 
pittance, to their employees, is a necessary condition for the viability of a low-fee private 
schooling model (Andrabi et al. 2008, Fennell, 2013). In many contexts, low-fee private 
schools are small-scale operations owned by private individuals (a recent study by Härmä, 
2016, for example notes that 87% of low-fee schools in her sample in Abuja, Nigeria are 
owned by private individuals suggesting that in this context of low-income settings, the low-
fee private school model is of an individual entrepreneur-owned-low-fee school). Similar 
findings are reported from Pakistan – ILM IDEAS (2014) in their study of 305 (what they term 
low cost) private schools across primary, middle and secondary levels in Punjab, Sindh and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (with fees ranging from Rs.300-Rs. 2000/month) found that 63% of 
these schools were unregistered and owned by sole-proprietors.  
 
These small enterprises typically also charge low fees. Andrabi et al. (2008) show that the 
median annual fee in a rural private school in Pakistan in 2000 was Rs.600 and this, they 
argue, suggests that the monthly fee was typically less than the daily wage of an unskilled 
wage worker. Moreover, their study shows that the fixed costs of running low-fee schools are 
typically low, with the largest share (up to 90%) of the schools’ operational costs constituting 
teacher wages. A typical low-fee school in rural Pakistan employed 4 teachers, mostly locally 
resident women with at least a secondary education and enrolled about 100 children (cited in 
Andrabi et al. 2013). However, despite charging apparently low fees, low-income families 
may struggle to meet the expenses on a regular basis. For example, Härmä (2016a), in her 
study of low-income contexts within Abuja, also notes that even when schools are charging 
apparently low fees, many parents find it difficult to pay fees and schools report ‘bad debts’. A 
large percentage (62%) of proprietors in her sample also suggested that parents are irregular 
in paying fees. Resultant cash flow problems mean that school proprietors also have difficulty 
paying teacher salaries. Some of these findings have been reported by other researchers and 
in other contexts (Srivastava 2006, Adelabu and Rose 2004, Härmä and Adefisayo 2013, 
Schirmer 2010). Such constraints add to the financial woes of such enterprises. ILM IDEAS 
(2014) corroborate these findings – with the surveyed school heads suggesting parental 
affordability and lack of interest as two main determinants of student dropouts in the study 
sample in Pakistan.  
 
Andrabi et al. (2013) note that in rural Pakistan the low-fee model’s viability is based on 
keeping operational costs low and with teacher salaries usually constituting a large proportion 
of costs (between 80-90%), these types of schools typically tend to employ young, educated 
females who are limited in terms of mobility and in terms of outside employment 
opportunities. The authors, using data from rural Punjab, document the existence of a 
‘women as teachers’ supply channel – they show how the presence of a Girls Secondary 
School (GSS) impacts private provision, more than doubling the number of women with 
secondary or higher education and how the fraction of secondary educated females, in turn, 
has a large impact on private provision (while the fraction of similarly educated men does 
                                                 
 
7 http://tribune.com.pk/story/1070143/schools-privatisation-teachers-warn-to-resist-punjab-govt-move/  
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not). Moreover, the authors argue that whilst demand-side explanations would expect that 
teacher wages should then increase in GSS villages, the supply-side explanation actually 
suggests the opposite – the authors note that in villages where a GSS exists, private school 
wages are typically 27% lower. Thus, it is these lower wages that offer GSS villages a 
‘substantial cost advantage’. Moreover, private school wages are lower still in villages with 
more restricted female labour markets (p. 3). This paper, therefore, provides strong evidence 
of the very ‘tight link between the teacher labour market and educational markets in a low-
income setting...’ (p. 4). It also cites the example of Alderman et al.’s (2003) study which tried 
to increase the supply of schools through the private educational market but which faced 
failure precisely because of an inability to find teachers. In this study, two pilot programmes 
were initiated in Balochistan, Pakistan, aimed at creating private schools for poor girls. 
However, whilst the pilots were relatively successful in urban areas, they failed in rural areas. 
One of the key reasons for this failure was the unavailability of teachers.  
 
Thus, the low fees charged by these low-fee private schools are sustained by their reliance 
on low teacher salaries typically paid to young female teachers’ resident in the village (more 
than 70% from within the village where they were born) in a patriarchal society facing limited 
geographical and occupational mobility (Andrabi et al. 2013, p. 5). Andrabi et al.’s (2013) 
paper also shows that it is typically not feasible for these types of schools to hire male 
teachers; they would command higher wages, and neither increasing class-sizes nor 
increasing fees would be a feasible option for the private schools to offset the higher male 
costs. In fact, doing so would result in a reduction in educational quality which would reduce 
the competitive advantage of the private schools as compared to the free state schooling on 
offer. This is also substantiated by the relatively high price elasticity based on Pakistani data 
which indicates that a 1% increase in prices would reduce market share per private school by 
1.2% making fee hikes not feasible (Carneiro et al. 2010 cited in Andrabi et al. 2013, p. 20).  
 
Other studies from Pakistan also discuss how ‘edupreneurs’ in Pakistan running low-fee 
private schools are limited in their ability to both expand their schools and improve 
educational quality due to the fact that fees are typically the only source of revenue (ILM 
IDEAS 2014). The business model of the 305 surveyed schools in 3 provinces in Pakistan 
shows that low-fee schools’ financial strategy requires maintain costs below revenue levels 
that can be derived from the market and this, in turn, requires reducing per student costs 
through paying low teacher salaries (p. 29). A ‘supply driven’ labour market within the low-fee 
sector ensures low salaries and the achievement of economies of scale. The profile of 
teachers within this sector reflects these realities – these teachers are young females without 
sufficient outside opportunities. At such low wages, low-fee schools typically attract lower 
qualified and untrained teachers (p. 30).  
 
Thus, keeping operational costs low by paying low salaries is an important condition for the 
sustainability of the low-fee school model. Using a different approach, Kingdon (2016) uses 
national data from India (National Sample Survey, 2014-2015) to benchmark the mean and 
median fee levels in private schools in different states of India. Combined with average 
enrolment levels (based on DISE data), the author computes the resulting average monthly 
revenue levels of private schools to give an idea of the maximum salary they could offer to 
their teachers. As an illustrative example, she notes that the average enrolment in recognised 
private unaided schools in Uttar Pradesh is 180 children/school and the median fee level is 
Rs.117/month. This would generate a mean revenue for the school of Rs.180x117= 
Rs.21,177 per month which would suggest they could potentially employ 5 teachers (leaving 
some profit for the entrepreneur and other school expenses). Thus, schools would need to 
keep salary costs low in order to remain operational8.  
 
                                                 
 
8 This paragraph is based on an email exchange with Geeta Kingdon (dated August, 9th), in which she 
shared this information on some on-going research.  
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Similar findings are reported in other contexts. For example, Härmä’s (2016a) study of low-
fee private schools in the slums of Abuja finds that the main recurrent expenditure typically 
constitutes the salary bill for teaching and non-teaching staff (in the region of 73% of total 
costs in registered schools and 66% in unregistered schools). This not only requires a 
sufficient number of fee-paying pupils, but may also necessitate multi-grade teaching (to keep 
staff levels low in smaller schools) but also the need to pay very low salaries. Table 7 
illustrates the salaries paid in low-fee private schools and shows that registered schools are 
typically able to pay their teachers better salaries as compared to their unregistered 
counterparts, and this, the author explains is linked to registered schools being able to have 
larger pupil numbers and being able to charge higher fees.  
 
Table 7: Abuja, Nigeria: Full time teacher salaries, by school registration status 
(monthly), US$.  


















primary 53.2 22.5 100.0 
79 
40.8 11.3 100.0 
156 
Lowest 52.3 27.5 110.0 82 40.7 11.3 125.0 167 
Middle 64.3 30.0 135.0 82 48.6 11.3 140.0 167 
Highest 84.1 37.5 175.0 82 59.2 11.3 150.0 167 
Source: Härmä (2016a), Table 20. $1 = 200 Naira at the time of the data collection.  
 
Härmä (2016b) studying low-fee private schools in slums in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania reports 
similar low teacher salaries (see below). And similar findings are observed in Kampala, 
Uganda (Table 9). 
 
Table 8: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Teacher salaries, by registration status, in low-fee 
private schools, per month (total teacher salary divided by 12 months), US$ 
 
 Registered Unregistered All schools 
Pre-primary salary 
level  
75.4 47.7 53.8 
Other education 
levels salary 
111.7 91.6 109.3 
Source: Source: Härmä (2016b), Note: $1 = TSh 2,200 at the time of the data collection. 
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Table 9: Kampala, Kenya: Teacher salaries in low-fee private schools (monthly) in US$, 






Average lowest salary 51.3 38.9 48.0 
Average median salary 79.5 55.3 71.2 
Average highest salary 105.1 64.1 94.4 
Note: at the time of data collection in June 2016, US$1 was equal to 3,375 Ugandan Shillings. 
Source: Härmä (2016c) 
 
Private school wages are substantially lower than wages paid to government school 
teachers 
 
Härmä (2015) summarises some of the evidence on the documented low pay within the low-
fee schools in various developing country contexts. In rural Uttar Pradesh, she notes that the 
private school teacher pay was found to be one-tenth of a government teacher’s salary with 
government teachers typically earning in one month what a private school teacher would earn 
in a year (Härmä 2008 cited in Härmä 2015). Similarly, Ohara (2013) found private school 
teacher salaries to be one tenth, sometimes even less, than government teacher salaries in 
Delhi (cited in Härmä 2015). Tooley and Dixon (2005, p. 37 cited in Härmä, 2015) found 
private school teacher pay to be less than a third of government school teachers in Ga, 
Ghana; Hyderabad, India; and Lagos, Nigeria).  
 
Andrabi et al. in the LEAPS report (2008) document extremely low salaries of private school 
teachers, comparable to those of unskilled workers in villages in Pakistan. In particular, they 
note that teachers in private schools ‘are paid a fraction of the salary of public school 
teachers…’ (p. 59). Even after controlling for observed differences (such as experience, 
gender etc.), the authors find that government school teacher salaries in rural areas of 
Punjab are 3-4 times as high as their private school counterparts.  
 
Similar findings are reported by different researchers in India. Kremer & Muralidharan (2009) 
using data from a nationally representative survey of rural private schools in India from 2003, 
notes that private school teacher salaries are a fifth of their government school counterparts 
(and sometimes as low as a tenth), and these low salaries enable private schools in these 
contexts to hire more teachers, reduce pupil-teacher ratios and reduce multi-grade teaching 
(p. 2). Goyal and Pandey (2009) in their study of teachers in different types of schools in 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh find that private school teacher salaries are between 
one-seventh and one-eighth of those of government school teachers. Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2013) further show that private school teacher salaries in their study area of 
Andhra Pradesh are around one eighth of regular government teacher salaries (and even 
lower than that of government teachers hired on short term contracts).  
 
Kingdon (2010) also documents private school teachers’ mean pay as a percentage of 
regular teachers’ mean pay at the primary/junior school level in different parts of India in 
different years. This is illustrated in Table 10 below. The secular increase in regular 
government teachers’ pay as a multiple of private pay has meant, for example, that 
government teacher salary as a multiple of private salary has increased steadily from about 
2.5:1 in the early 1990s to as much as 12:1 in 2008. The author argues that these gaps 
would widen significantly following the Sixth Pay Commission which impacted government 
teacher salaries and not those in the private sector, with regular government school teachers 
earning significantly more than their private school counterparts, especially in low-fee schools 
which rely on paying low salaries to ensure they are able to charge low fees from their 
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students. The author argues that following the Sixth Pay Commission, private school 
teachers’ mean pay is likely to be around 5% that of regular government school teachers in 
UP, ‘…a truly grotesque level of inequality in teacher pay.’ (p. 8). Kingdon argues that these 
large salary increases among regular government school teachers as compared to both their 
private school counterparts but also with respect to contract teachers and the average person 
in the population, has impacted both on the social distance between students and teachers 
and on the ability of the community to influence teacher accountability.  
 
Table 10: Private unaided schools’ mean monthly teacher salary as a percentage of 
government school teachers’ mean monthly salary, different parts of India, different 
years.
 
Source: Kingdon (2010), table 2, p. 7.  
 
Härmä (2016d) in her study of non-state provision of education in Maputo, Mozambique also 
finds that private school teachers are typically paid far less than their civil service 
counterparts. The mean salary of a private school teacher with average experience in her 
sample was US$ 76/month which compares unfavourably with a market trader selling bread 
and peanuts (p.10). Private school teacher salaries also compare unfavourably with civil 
service teachers working at some of the sample schools – private school teachers are paid a 
third less than their civil service counterparts.  
 
One of the consequences of the large salary increases among civil service teachers and the 
extremely low wages paid to teachers especially in low-fee private schools is the resultant 
discontent among those in the cadre. In India, the large economic disparity created by high 
government teacher salary (as a result of the 6th Pay Commission), as compared to other 
teachers within the education system (contract teachers, private school teachers etc.), has 
also led to protests as well as extreme dissatisfaction amongst this latter group particularly 
due to the fact that they have been shown to exhibit higher levels of effort (as proxied by 
lower absence rates and higher time on task) as well as better pupil outcomes (Kingdon 
20109, Atherton & Kingdon 2010). Similar discontent among the private school cadre has 
also been reported in newspaper accounts in Pakistan. A further harmful consequence of 
large civil-service rents (as compared to the private sector pay) is that a market can emerge 
for these jobs where politicians appoint candidates willing to pay for coveted teacher 
positions and these teachers are likely to exert less effort having paid for their jobs rather 
than being competitively selected into them (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013). 






Low fee private schools pay a market clearing wage which is typically below mandated 
minimum wages but which is competitive 
 
According to Kingdon (2010), private schools typically do not comply with government-
mandated minimum wages and instead pay market-clearing wages that are determined by 
existing demand and supply of teachers (p. 8). In India, for example, the very high levels of 
unemployment of educated persons within the country (11.7% in rural India and 10.1% in 
urban India, individuals with undergraduate degrees) means the existence of an excess 
supply of workers with private schools (like any other private enterprise) taking advantage of 
this to pay market-clearing wages. According to Kingdon, this is especially true at the primary 
level where the skills of the individuals are typically viewed to suffice in teaching children at 
this level. Andrabi et al. (2013) also argue that the potential pool of educated teachers is 
limited in Pakistan and in other developing countries – in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 
less than 12% of the population complete secondary schooling and even fewer do so in rural 
areas (p. 2).  
 
Evidence from other regions also suggests that LFPS typically tend to pay wages well below 
the legal minimum wage. For example, in Lagos and Kwara States (Nigeria), teacher salaries 
in all the low-fee schools studied were found to be significantly below the mandated minimum 
wage. There were clear differences between different types of low-fee schools – registered 
LFPS were found to pay 1.5 times as much as un-registered schools in both locations 
(Härmä 2011a and Härmä 2011b cited in Härmä, 2015). Härmä (2011d) notes that in Lagos, 
the mean private school salary was 60% of minimum wage and about 42% of the starting 
salary of a government school teacher (Härmä, 2015, p. 183). However, several researchers 
studying low fee schools across various contexts have noted that private schools typically 
offer low but market-competitive wage rates.  
 
Private schools are able to offer a low salary to their employees because they can tap into 
specific demographic groups (unemployed educated youth, secondary educated women with 
limited geographical and occupational mobility and other cultural constraints) who are 
typically less qualified and have less experience than their government school counterparts. 
ILM IDEAS (2014) also reports that teachers in the low-fee sector earn wages ‘well below 
equivalent salaries in the state school sector and below the minimum wage level of PKR 
9000 in Punjab.’ (p. 30). However, the pool of educated unemployed rural secondary school 
and college graduates from which low-fee private schools typically hire appears to be large 
enough to ensure that the labour supply of such teachers is fairly elastic (Kingdon and 
Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010 cited in Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013).  
 
Whilst some of the substantial wage premium that government school teachers earn over and 
above the market clearing wage offered to private teachers is explained by their better 
education and outside opportunities, and partly by a compensating differential to locate in 
rural and remote areas, but mainly represents a union and civil service premium 
(Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013). In discussing contract government teachers within 
their study, the authors note that rather than being ‘exploitative’, contract teachers’ 
employment terms are actually in line with the market clearing wage paid by the private 
sector and whilst these low wages may seem exploitative, in reality the distortion is not the 
low salaries of contract (and private school teachers) but the above-market wages of civil 
service teachers who are shown to produce the same or worse outcomes among children at 
significantly higher costs.  
 
Teachers in the low-fee sector lack motivation and commitment 
 
Teacher satisfaction and morale are documented to be low within the low-fee sector. This is 
unsurprising given that these teachers are typically unqualified, untrained and poorly paid 
with little or no benefits and job security and very low career progression prospects (Adelabu 
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and Rose 2004; Härmä 2008; Härmä and Adefisayo 2013 cited in Härmä 2016c). As already 
mentioned, in Pakistan, the pre-existing wage differentials between men and women as well 
the latter’s occupational and geographical immobility are capitalised upon to populate low-fee 
schools with female teachers. However, a recent study from rural Punjab clearly documents 
the relatively lower performance of female teachers (across both government and private 
school samples) with one explanation being the lack of motivation and commitment of female 
teachers in general as compared to their male counterparts (Marine 2015). The author notes 
that 27% of the female teachers (as opposed to 16% male teachers) in his sample declared 
that they would stop teaching once they got married and 47% females stating they would stop 
depending on their spouses’ decision as opposed to only 3% males. Alternatively, the author 
proposes that female teachers’ responsibilities at home may also influence their motivation 
and effort at work – with female teachers in the sample spending on average 5 hours doing 
house work as opposed to the 3 hours spent by their male counterparts. This also links in 
with the low status awarded to the teaching profession in the country with teaching often 
perceived as the last choice among young professionals (UNESCO 2013 and Westbrook et 
al. 2009 cited in Marine 2015). 
 
Whilst the business model of low-fee schools necessitates paying low salaries to staff, one of 
the consequences of this is that the resultant threat of loss of employment for teachers may 
be less worrying than if pay were higher. Additionally, in rural areas, the pool of entrants is so 
limited that dismissal may be less likely due to the difficulty of finding a replacement (Härmä, 
2016e). This might, in turn, impact effort and incentives within the school.  
 
The LEAPS (2008) study illustrates that turnover among teachers in the private sector is high 
– 25% of the teachers are replace every year and whilst ‘…this frequent turnover may hurt 
the private sector…it also allows constant replenishment of the teaching workforce and 
pruning of non-performing teachers’ (p. 59). However, evidence from the ILM IDEAS (2014) 
study does not suggest that the low salaries paid to teachers within the low-fee sector had 
any negative impact on staff turnover. According to the study, one of the interviewed school 
heads noted that neighbouring schools offered even lower salaries than his school (as low as 
Rs.1500/month). Thus, the outside options available to teachers within these schools are 
limited and the alternative for many would require them to leave the community to search for 
work or to remain within the home. Poor labour relations, therefore, do not seem to feature 
within the functioning of the low-fee model (p. 30). Nevertheless, the same study notes that 
the average tenure of a teacher within a low-fee school is typically 1-3 years (at the middle 
and secondary level) with teachers at the primary level having a substantially greater turnover 
than those teaching at higher levels. More specifically, the study finds that within primary 
schools, very few teachers leave in the first few months but 19% tend to leave within one 
academic year. The study suggests that within these low-fee schools, teachers at the primary 
level are mostly young women who use teaching as a ‘short-term job opportunity before 
returning to studies or getting married.’ (p. 31).  
 
Similar findings, of teachers in low-fee schools using teaching as a ‘time pass’ have been 
cited from contexts such as India with ‘ambivalent’ teacher attitudes with teachers suggesting 
that whilst their private sector jobs were good enough for the moment, they aspired to better 
paying government jobs with ‘not having to do any work’ in cushy government jobs cited as 
an important attraction within the sector (Härmä, 2015). Within the ILM IDEAS study, 
teachers typically tended to cite attractive employment opportunities and higher salaries as 
reasons for arriving and leaving the workforce. Focus group discussions within the study also 
revealed that sometimes teacher training is used as a non-financial compensation for 
teaching staff although this tends to be confined to those teaching at higher education levels 
and to those who are already experienced teachers (p. 31). Moreover, there are limited 
incentives for private schools to train teachers. As Andrabi et al. (2015) note, better teachers 
in private schools move to schools that reward them more and this is ‘…consistent with the 
idea that the schooling market works by allocating scarce, productive teachers across 
vertically-differentiated schools…and that high value-added teachers exit low quality schools 
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faster, as do low value-added teachers in high quality schools. The high turnover and attrition 
could, in turn, create problems in the labor market as it sharply reduces the incentive for 
school owners to train teachers. Particularly in low quality schools, owners will realize that 
more training will make it more likely that they will lose their teachers to higher quality 
schools. The gains to training will be realized by the schools that the teachers eventually 
move to rather than the schools that trained them. This in turn suggests experiments where 
such training is subsidized by the government.’ (p. 106).  
 
 
5. Is a minimum wage for teachers feasible and appropriate in Pakistan? 
 
Current wage policy in Pakistan is not efficient 
 
There is now sufficient evidence worldwide to showcase the importance of teacher quality in 
determining student learning. Evidence from Pakistan (and other parts of the world) has 
consistently shown that some characteristics of teachers are especially important in 
determining student learning – teachers with temporary contracts appear to perform better 
than those on permanent ones and locally recruited teachers may be more effective (Marine, 
2015), and how a teacher teaches within a classroom is a critical determinant of student 
learning whilst standard resume characteristics appear to have no relationship with student 
outcomes (Aslam & Kingdon 2011). However, previous evidence has also convincingly 
shown that teachers in the public sector are typically rewarded for resume characteristics 
(such as qualifications, experience and tenure) that are not directly linked to student 
outcomes (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). This study from Pakistan highlights the inefficient 
nature particularly of government teacher wage schedules where teachers are typically 
rewarded based on fixed rules rather than based on their performance. In some respects, the 
authors find that private school wage schedules are relatively more efficient and flexible 
though in some instances private schools also reward their teachers based on observable 
characteristics (which are shown not to directly impact student learning) perhaps to signal to 
prospective parents that they have qualified staff despite the fact that qualifications do not 
necessarily improve staff productivity.  
 
Marine (2015) also argues that data on both government and private schools in rural Punjab 
indicates that the ‘current wage policy is…far from being the most efficient’ (p.35). In 
particular, the author argues that in their data both government and private school teacher 
wages are determined by gender and by qualifications. Female teachers are typically paid 
less in their sample and this is partly due to the lack of outside options. The rewards to 
training appear large in the public sector while the private sector appears to reward 
experience. Teachers on permanent contracts are also paid more in public schools although 
this is not the case in private schools. In both school types, local teachers are paid less and 
this difference is higher in private schools. One explanation put forward by the author for this 
finding is that locally resident teachers value convenience and safety and have lower travel 
costs and are thus willing to accept lower wages. However, similar to the findings by Aslam 
and Kingdon (2011), the author notes that these criteria determining wages do not 
necessarily determine teacher quality. Hence, there are glaring inefficiencies in the wage 
schedules across the two sectors, but perhaps more so in the government sector than in the 
private one. Nevertheless, teacher wage policy could be a useful tool for policy makers to 
improve school quality as these policies are easier to implement than those aimed at raising 
teacher education and experience. In particular, there is typically no system of rewarding 
teacher performance through higher wages.  
 
Rewards and penalties in the private sector are different than the public sector 
 
Broadly speaking, the private sector is far more flexible and tends to link pay with 
performance as compared to the government sector, which typically rewards inputs. The 
LEAPS study (Andrabi et al. 2008) shows that better paid teachers in low-fee private schools 
  
21 
are associated with higher student scores. Moreover, the reward and penalty structures 
facing teachers across the two sectors are also different with private sector compensation 
schemes rewarding teachers more for effort and performance as well as to outside 
opportunities (those who are likely to be paid more outside the teaching sector are also paid 
higher salaries as teachers). Moreover, once they are hired, teachers in private schools face 
stringent accountability measures and credible threats to dismissal, unlike their government 
school counterparts who have ‘jobs for life’ and who are virtually unsackable.  
 
A more recent study in Pakistan based on the LEAPS data set by Bau and Das (2016) 
illustrates that decreasing public sector wages by as much as third does not significantly 
affect the pool of job-seekers suggesting that ‘…the outside option is never more attractive 
than the public sector, even after the wage decline.’ (p. 5). Using this rich data set, the 
authors arrive at three main conclusions:  
1) Teacher quality matters for student outcomes within the Pakistani context as much as it 
does in OECD countries.  
2) Observed teacher characteristics are linked to teacher compensation but explain no 
more than 5% of the variation in teacher value added. 
3) There is no correlation observed between teacher value added and wages in the public 
sector with a policy change used by the authors (public sector hiring shifted from 
permanent to temporary contracts reducing wages by 35%) having no negative impact on 
teacher value added in the short term or in the longer term (after 4 years). Thus, the 500% 
differential in teacher wages between private and public sector workers observed within 
their sample is indicative of highly inefficient wage schedules that prevail within the public 
sector in Pakistan.  
 
Importantly, the authors suggest that reducing public sector wages is unlikely to impact either 
the pool of entrants or teacher value added in terms of student outcomes. However, the 
authors caution that whilst the natural experiment used in this analysis mimics a wholesale 
reduction in wages, the policy change combined changes in remuneration as well as returns 
to effort (permanent versus temporary contracts) and therefore, the authors are unable to 
distinguish between these two potential effects. Therefore, the results are actually showing 
that ‘temporary contracts induce a combination of teacher effort and quality that can yield the 
same learning at half the cost.’ (p. 7). In a companion paper, Bau and Das (2014 cited in 
Andrabi et al. 2015) compute the productivity of teachers in the private sector using LEAPS 
data over 4 years and show that unlike in the public sector, there is a strong correlation 
between teacher wages and teacher value-added in private schools. The authors suggest 
that this correlation exists because better teachers move to schools that reward them better 
(with no variation in wages apparent by teacher value-added within the same school).  
 
Laissez Faire? Let the market do its job? 
 
This rapid review of evidence has shown that the dynamics facing the private sector, and in 
particular the low-fee sector, are very different from those facing the government sector (or 
even elite private schools). In particular, teachers salaries in the government sector are high 
and the wage schedules particularly inefficient (with teachers rewarded for possessing 
observable characteristics that have been shown in the literature to be linked to student 
outcomes) and are often determined more by the bargaining power of strong teacher unions 
and associations and pre-determined wage scales than by productivity (Aslam et al. 2016). 
Teacher salaries in the private sector and especially the low-fee sector, on the other hand, 
are often significantly lower. These salaries are often below the minimum wage but are 
competitive, market-clearing wages. Unlike public sector wages that are determined through 
fixed criteria and do not respond to outside conditions, wages within the private sector and 
especially within the low-fee sector are responsive to market conditions. 
 
Opinion, however, is ideologically divided; is it fair for private schools to ‘exploit’ (often) young 
women with limited outside options and occupational and geographical immobility? Or are 
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these private schools offering employment opportunities and hence empowering these young 
women who are limited by alternative outside opportunities? This question does not have a 
simple answer. To come close to answering it, however, we must ask:  
1) What is the intention of a minimum wage legislation policy especially within the 
context of teachers?  
2) What are the realities of a low-fee or budget private school?  
3) And finally, to what extent can we expect any policy to be actually implemented within 
a diverse and highly heterogeneous private sector?  
 
With respect to the first, as a wage policy, a minimum wage intends to set a legal minimum 
pay threshold to guarantee a given wage to all employees. However, even as a well-
intentioned employment policy, it may not have the desired textbook consequences. For 
example, a minimum wage, by interfering with the normal workings of the market, may induce 
unemployment or cost-push inflation or may increase the number of workers working in the 
‘black market’ and may not benefit the poorest. In the context of teachers, and when an 
employment policy is used as an ‘education policy’, many would agree that public school 
teachers already earn substantially more not only than their private school counterparts but 
also compared to average individuals in the country at least in South Asia. Any attempt by the 
government to reduce their salaries is likely to be met by intense resistance through union 
pressure and militant activities (Kingdon and Muzammil 2009). This leaves teachers in the 
private sector at large. As already mentioned, the private sector is not a homogenous entity in 
Pakistan (or in other parts of the world). Whilst a minimum wage policy may not work to the 
detriment of a recognised, elite, private school located in an urban area, it may have severe 
implications on the viability of a low-fee private school.  
 
As already mentioned, the business model of low-fee schools relies extensively on paying 
low salaries to teachers which are then passed on to students in the form of low fees. The 
reality of a low-fee private school is very different from that of an elite private school or a 
larger urban or semi-urban school. A lack of resources (and the resultant viability of the 
business model) is one of the main reasons why budget schools cannot hire teachers at 
higher salaries. Indeed, a recent study in Punjab, India, by the Centre for Civil Society (2014), 
suggests that school owners in such low-fee establishments are in ‘constant worry’ following 
the RTE Act (2009) in India which mandates every private school to follow specific ‘input-
centric’ norms and standards to obtain recognition. In particular, the school owners in budget 
schools cannot hire teachers at par with high fee charging schools or government schools. In 
their study, the authors of this report found that the average monthly salary of a teacher in a 
‘budget private school’ was Rs 1925 in Punjab. However, there is a ‘resident fear’ among 
school owners that the 6th Pay Commission may act as the benchmark for deciding minimum 
teacher salaries (p. 6). According to this report, this has resulted in many such schools either 
shutting down or fearing shutting down as they are unlikely to be able to comply with such 
stringent norms if they are enforced. Other researchers (see Kingdon’s opinion pieces for 
example10) have also argued that many of these infeasible norms and standards set out in the 
RTE Act have resulted in large-scale low-fee private school closures, have reduced the 
existing education standards within India and have ‘…raided the autonomy of private schools 
(by foisting) the same ruinous official/political interference on private schools that has been 
so injurious to the running of government schools.’  
 
Thus, even well-intentioned government policies can inadvertently result in low-fee private 
school closures by directly impinging on the functioning of fee-charging providers. The 
unintended consequences of an ill-thought out legislation can have far-reaching impacts on 
the education system in Pakistan. Evidence from around the world now shows that, overall, 
private schools are accessed by large proportions of children and are able to provide learning 






outcomes that are at least at par with those provided by the state sector, albeit at a 
significantly lower per pupil cost (see for instance Day Ashely et al. 2014). Thus, any policy or 
legislation that is likely to impact millions of children needs to be carefully thought through. 
One possible solution is to consider a minimum wage based on the size of the low-fee 
school, for example exempt all schools employing less than a given number of individuals. 
However, careful consideration needs to be made before mandating such a policy.    
 
It is also important to consider another vital aspect – to what extent can we expect such a 
policy to be actually implemented within the private sector? This relates to existing concerns 
of the ability of the government to regulate the private sector. Many private schools operate 
‘blow the radar’ and within the extra-legal sector (unrecognised and unregistered schools, 
see for instance Dixon (2012). There is no understanding of the scale of these schools in 
many contexts, including Pakistan, let alone the government being able to implement or 
enforce any policies on them. Additionally, there are those schools that may have gained 
recognition from the government and supposedly abide by the regulations of recognition but 
researchers report unofficial payments and bribes as being rampant within these settings 
regardless of the school meeting mandated government criteria or not (Dixon and Tooley, 
2005 cited in Dixon 2012). Adding an additional policy through a minimum wage in such an 
environment is unlikely to meet the intended outcome; if anything it may add additional 
burdens on already struggling school proprietors to make unofficial payments to government 
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